What is an “emerging threat”? Or even more generally speaking, what is a “threat” in the first place?
There are numerous definitions proposed and used for the word “threat” and its synonym “hazard”, and I leave it to readers of this blog (and myself) to explore the myriad definitions for such terms as these described in the SARMAPedia just to see what I mean (this website is part of the Security Analysis and Risk Management Association, or SARMA, initiative to develop a common lexicon; participation is encouraged).
For simplicity, let’s go with the following simple and generic definition of threat: a threat is a source of potential harm. Of course whether or not something is harmful is in the eye of the beholder, but for the purposes of this discussion assume that whatever we label as a threat is harmful to you or your interests. Now let’s examine the definitions of threat when qualified by one of four words: “emerging,” “emergent,” “speculative,” and “notional.”
- To qualify a threat as “emerging” insists that it must be “newly formed” or “coming into prominence” (definition for “emerging” taken from Answers.com).
- To qualify a threat as “emergent” means that it is “coming into view, existence, or notice” (definition for “emergent” taken from Answers.com).
- To quality a threat as “speculative” means that it is reasoned from “inconclusive evidence, conjecture, or supposition” (definition for “speculation” taken from Answers.com).
- To qualify a threat as “notional” means that it is “speculative or theoretical” or imaginary (definition for “notional” taken from Answers.com).
According to the above qualifier definitions, it seems to follow that an “emerging threat” or “emergent threat” in the context of terrorism is one for which there is at least a little bit of evidence to support that it is on the minds of potential adversaries. That is, there seems to be this underlying assumption that evidence exists to justify labeling a threat as “newly formed” or “coming into view.” Weaker in form but just as important to be aware of from the standpoint of a defender desiring to defeat surprise is the “speculated threat” or “notional threat” for which there need not be evidence to support it being a considered an option of our enemies. As with anything else in the realm of innovation (a trait that many scholars believe our adversaries possess), it is just a matter of time before an articulated speculative threat becomes an emergent threat – all that is required is for an adversary to entertain the threat as a real option for consideration. In fact, a 2002 Washington Post editorial entitled “They Heard It All Here, and That’s the Trouble” (written by Dennis Pluchinsky, an intelligence professional and well-respected educator) complained that the media pretty much hands ideas to our adversaries on where US vulnerabilities lie and what can be done to exploit them. So, I feel it is safe to assume that a speculative threat written about in open-sources is, or will become in due time, an emerging threat just by the mere fact that such ideas are out in the open for everyone in the world to read. The only thing missing is the documents or testimony to prove that a threat has transcended the threshold between speculative and emergent.
Now, why did I say all this? As I was digging through my database of academic papers, I came across a number of papers on novel terrorist threats, all of which are labeled as emergent. Few of these papers actually provide evidence to the fact that these threats are on the minds of al-Qaeda planners, but they do provide sufficient detail about them to prompt serious consideration if a bad-guy happened to stumble upon them. I decided to list six of these papers, not to make these ideas even more accessible, but to inspire consideration on the part of defenders challenged by a presumed creative and determined adversary. After all, our number one vulnerability is ignorance, and our adversaries seek to identify and exploit this ignorance to achieve surprise against us.
These six papers (with abstracts in bullets) are as follows:
Baird, R. A. (2006). “Pyro-Terrorism: The Threat of Arson-Induced Forest Fires as a Future Terrorist Weapon of Mass Destruction.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 29, No. 5, pp. 415-428, doi: 10.1080/10576100600698477.
- The United States is at significant risk of a future pyro-terrorist attack - when terrorists unleash the latent energy in the nation’s forests to achieve the effect of a weapon of mass destruction - the threat, must be defined America’s vulnerabilities understood, and action taken to mitigate this danger to the United States.
Borio, L., et al. (2002). “Hemorrhagic Fever Viruses as Biological Weapons.” Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 287, No. 18, pp. 2391-2405, url: http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/287/18/2391.
- Weapons disseminating a number of [Hemorrhagic Fever Viruses] HFVs could cause an outbreak of an undifferentiated febrile illness 2 to 21 days later, associated with clinical manifestations that could include rash, hemorrhagic diathesis, and shock. The mode of transmission and clinical course would vary depending on the specific pathogen. Diagnosis may be delayed given clinicians’ unfamiliarity with these diseases, heterogeneous clinical presentation within an infected cohort, and lack of widely available diagnostic tests. Initiation of ribavirin therapy in the early phases of illness may be useful in treatment of some of these viruses, although extensive experience is lacking. There are no licensed vaccines to treat the diseases caused by HFVs.
Bunker, R. J. (2008). “Terrorists and Laser Weapons: An Emergent Threat.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 31, No. 5, pp. 434-455, doi: 10.1080/10576100801980294.
- The trends leading to the emergent threat of terrorist laser weapons use are that a military weaponry transition from conventional to Directed Energy Weapons is taking place; that laser weapons offer clear tactical and operational advantages over conventional weapons; that laser prices are dropping while laser performance is increasing; that criminals, criminal-soldiers, and foreign militaries have all utilized laser devices and weapons for counteroptical purposes; and that criminal-soldiers are evolving and getting more sophisticated from both an organizational and weaponry use perspective. This article will look at the aforementioned trends, analyze them, and then offer some concluding thoughts concerning terrorist laser weapons use futures.
Lee, R. V., Harbison, R. D., and Draughon, F. A. (2003). “Food as a Weapon.” Food Protection Trends, Vol. 23, No. 8, pp. 664-674 [this article is not available electronically anymore]
- The use of food as a weapon has been practiced since antiquity. Assassination by poisoning food and wine is well documented in history and in literature. Mass casualties because of spontaneous spoilage of grain and meat have been common, but attempts at deliberate adulteration or contamination of foods to produce mass casualties have been only occasionally successful. Nevertheless, the food supply of industrialized nations is vulnerable to terrorist attacks. A major problem is the inability to identify criminal intent rapidly in outbreaks of foodborne illness caused by common pathogens or animal-borne diseases. This review addresses the vulnerability of the food system, motivations for harm, detection of criminal intent and security measures that may minimize risks.
Van Keuren, E., Wilkenfeld, J., and Knighten, J. (1991). “Utilization of High-Power Microwave Sources in Electronic Sabotage and Terrorism.” Proceedings of IEEE Security Technology Conference 1991, pp. 16-20, url: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel2/575/5225/00202184.pdf.
- High-power microwave (HPM) sources have been under investigation for several years as potential weapons for a variety of sabotage, terrorism, counter-security systems and combat applications. To a large extent, work in these areas has been limited to the military community and its contractors. However, in recent years there has been an increasing awareness of HPM as a tool for commercial sabotage and civil terrorism. As such, there is a need for greatly increased attention by the security community. With respect to this security conference, the key points to recognize are the insidious nature of HPM and the many areas in which it can impact on security technology. Computers and other equipments can be damaged without user recognition of the cause. HPM has the capability to penetrate not only radio front ends but also the most minute shielding penetrations throughout the equipment. The potential exists for significant damage to security and other devices and circuits, and even injury to humans. Electronic sabotage and terrorism, and HPM in particular, should be of significant interest to security practitioners.
Parfenov, Y., Zdoukhov, L. N., and Radasky, W. A. (2004). “Conducted IEMI Threats for Commercial Buildings.” IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 404-411, doi: 10.1109/TEMC.2004.831883.
- While most of the emphasis has been focused on the radiated threat represented by intentional electromagnetic interference, it is clear that the threat from conducted disturbances should not be neglected. Conducted threats include those that are produced by the cable coupling of radiated fields and from the direct injection of conducted disturbances into the wiring of a building. It is well known that in the majority of cases, cables provide the most efficient means of transporting potentially damaging energy into equipment. The first part of this paper describes how electrical disturbances can impact electronic equipment inside a building through the power and earthing circuits. Measured data are summarized to illustrate how electrical signals propagate through the power and earthing circuits from the outside to the inside and what levels of signals create problems with electronic equipment. With this understanding of the impact of transient waveforms on electronic equipment and how these disturbances can propagate throughout a building, calculations are then used to evaluate different types of conducted threats to buildings.
3 responses so far ↓
1 Andrew // May 30, 2008 at 11:49 am
Interesting article!
This sounds to me like a good case for seperation of threat from vulnerability in risk analysis (as stated in R = T x V x C). A “speculative threat” above is not really a threat at all in my consideration, but an identified vulnerability. It makes a good case for the seperate consideration of vulnerability from threat - it is important to focus on both how vulnerable the point is AND on how much it is being threatened, and the above consideration seems to me to weaken the importance of the threat analysis. That is hazardous in risk calculus as it results in limited resources being appropriated against vulnerabilities with no capability or intent raised against them at the expense of areas otherwise of importance.
Threat is commonly considered as a function of Intent and Capability, with consideration sometimes given to Will or Historical Precident. Once the “speculative threat” i.e. vulnerability is identified, you can seperately search for adversary intent to use it (or exculpatory evidence showing they’ve chosen not to), which you identify as the key transition point. Perhaps it is correct to de-emphasize the importance of stated intent for publically published vulnerabilities and ensure a hard look at adversary capability (both current and near future)? Either way, I would say that labeling vulnerability as speculative threat does a disservice to threat analysis when they are better considered distinctly.
2 Will McGill // May 31, 2008 at 11:55 pm
Interesting… a speculative threat as vulnerability. Yes, I suppose this is the case when it comes down to it. A vulnerability is the ease at which one could achieve a specified consequence from a specified cause. To say that “deliberate mass forest fires” are a “speculative threat” is the same as saying we would suffer great loss if someone were to deliberately set mass forest fires. So really what we are making is a statement of our vulnerability, not a statement about actual intent and capability. Of course, one could speculate on all our vulnerabilities, but unless there is someone out there with the capability AND intent (however weak) to exploit it, it should then fall low on the list.
But as I often argue, the first step in defeating surprise is to find out more about what you do not know, so these “speculative threat” pieces are helpful at least from this standpoint.
Oh, stay tuned for a follow-on post describing several other speculative threats talked about in the published literature. One that might be of interest is a DHS study entitled “How Terrorists Might Exploit a Hurricane,” which can be readily found in PDF format through a simple Google search.
3 Ingrid Hernandez // Nov 12, 2008 at 7:42 pm
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